GAS are under development, but their effective use will require better understanding of how immunity develops following infection. Evidence from an animal model of skin infection suggests that the generation of enduring strain-specific immunity requires two infections by the same strain within a short time frame. It is not clear if this mechanism of immune development operates in humans, nor how it would contribute to the persistence of GAS in populations and affect vaccine impact. We used a mathematical model of GAS transmission, calibrated to data collected in an Indigenous Australian community, to assess whether this mechanism of immune development is consistent with epidemiological observations, and to explore its implications for the impact of a vaccine.
Abstract
Group A Streptococcus (GAS) skin infections are caused by a diverse array of strain types and are highly prevalent in Indigenous and other disadvantaged populations. The role of strain-specific immunity in preventing GAS infections is poorly understood, representing a critical knowledge gap in vaccine development. A recent GAS murine challenge study showed evidence that sterilising strain-specific and enduring immunity required two skin infections by the same GAS strain within three weeks. This mechanism of developing enduring immunity may be a significant impediment to the accumulation of immunity in populations.
We used a mathematical model of GAS transmission to investigate the epidemiological consequences of enduring strain-specific immunity developing only after two infections with the same strain within a specified interval. Accounting for uncertainty when correlating murine timeframes to humans, we varied this maximum inter-infection interval from 3 to 420 weeks to assess its impact on prevalence and strain diversity. Model outputs were compared with longitudinal GAS surveillance observations from northern Australia, a region with endemic infection. We also assessed the likely impact of a targeted strain-specific multivalent vaccine in this context.
Our model produced patterns of transmission consistent with observations when the maximum inter-infection interval for developing enduring immunity was 19 weeks. Our vaccine analysis suggests that the leading multivalent GAS vaccine may have limited impact on the prevalence of GAS in populations in northern Australia if strain-specific immunity requires repeated episodes of infection.
Our results suggest that observed GAS epidemiology from disease endemic settings is consistent with enduring strain-specific immunity being dependent on repeated infections with the same strain, and provide additional motivation for relevant human studies to confirm the human immune response to GAS skin infection. that each strain prompts a distinct immune response in hosts. 80 The model tracks the age, infection and immunity status of each host through time. 81 Changes in host infection and immunity status occur due to the clearance of infections, 82 transmission events, and waning immunity (detailed below), and are updated 83 synchronously at the end of each day. New susceptible individuals aged zero are 84 introduced into the population at a per capita rate d to replace individuals that are lost 85 due to natural death. We also model migration at a per capita rate of α (detailed 86 below). 87 Infection 88
In high incidence settings, multiple strains of GAS have been concurrently detected in 89 the same and different skin lesions of individuals [33] . Therefore, in our model, hosts 90 can be co-infected by multiple strains. We assume that a host can have a maximum of κ 91 infections at any one time (including multiple infections of the same strain), and that 92 the susceptibility of hosts to infection decreases as the total number of infections in each 93 host increases. These assumptions incorporate the effects of pathogen populations 94 directly competing for space and resources within the host, or indirectly interacting via 95 the host immune response. We calculate the relative susceptibility r of host i to an 96 uninfected host as
where g i (t) is the total number of infections of host i at time t and x > 0 is a number 98 scaling the level of resistance to acquisition of new infections due to the competitive 99 advantage of already established infections. Clearly, if host i is uninfected then r = 1, 100 and if the host is at infection carrying capacity κ then r = 0.
In the model, each host has on average c contacts with other hosts per day. The 109 contacts of infected hosts are chosen uniformly at random from the population, and the 110 outcomes of these contact events are then determined (i.e., whether or not a 111 transmission event occurs). We specify that transmission may only occur one-way from 112
the infected host to their contacts. The probability of a contact resulting in 113 transmission is B = βr, where β is the baseline probability of transmission, and r is the 114 relative susceptibility of a host to an uninfected host (detailed above). If the infected 115 host has more than one infection, only one of these co-infections can possibly transmit 116 during a single contact event. For co-infected hosts, we choose one infection uniformly 117 at random to attempt transmission. If this attempt fails, then the contact event does 118 not result in transmission. These rules correspond to the assumption that co-infected 119 hosts are not necessarily more infectious than hosts with a single infection. We also 120 specify that a host may only contract a maximum of one infection per day.
121
With these assumptions, we can calculate the basic reproduction number R 0 , which 122 is the expected number of secondary infections caused by a single infected host 123 introduced into a completely susceptible host population. A pathogen is expected to 124 cause an outbreak or become endemic in a host population if R 0 > 1. In our model, R 0 125 is defined as
Immunity not have temporary or enduring strain-specific immunity to. However, if this temporary 137 immunity wanes, then a subsequent infection by this strain will only confer temporary 138 immunity with the same characteristics as a first infection. This natural history of 139 infection is summarised in Fig 1. Henceforth, we refer to the duration w, as the 140 'maximum inter-infection interval' that enables the development of enduring 141 strain-specific immunity. Model of the natural history of disease with respect to a single strain. A: Hosts without prior immunity to a particular strain (S) become infected by contacting infected hosts (I 1 or I 2 ). These infections (I 1 ) clear at an average rate γ which confers temporary immunity (R 1 ). This temporary immunity reduces the duration of a subsequent infection (I 2 ) by a factor dependent on the strength of temporary strain-specific immunity (σ) if the subsequent infection occurs within a short-enough time window (the maximum inter-infection interval, w) from the time of clearance (green line). If infection does not occur within this time frame (blue line), then temporary immunity wanes and a subsequent infection has the characteristics of a first infection. If temporary immunity does not wane before the next infection, then the clearance of this next infection occurs faster, and confers enduring immunity protecting against further infection (R 2 ). B: An example of a host's immune response (solid black line) following three episodes of infection by the same strain. Here, the temporary immunity acquired following the first infection wanes before the second infection. The clearance of the second infection leads again to temporary immunity. However this becomes enduring immunity following the clearance of the third, more timely, infection. Note that the immune response is implicitly assumed to accumulate during an infection, leading to clearance (as shown by the dotted lines).
We note that in the model, it is possible for a host without any prior strain-specific 143 immunity of a strain to experience multiple infections of a particular strain 144 simultaneously. Due to our assumptions about strain clearance (detailed above), all 145 infections by the same strain will clear simultaneously in the model when the host 146 recovers from this strain, leading to a single immune response. We assume that such a 147 clearance event only confers temporary immunity.
148
In the mouse model [31] , the effect of the immune response was assessed by determining the number of colony forming units in skin and blood samples (bioburden) collected six days post inoculation. These showed a reduction in bioburden of approximately 90% for second infections of the same serotype compared to the first infection, provided that the second infection occurred within three weeks of the first.
However, if the second infection was a different serotype, this reduction in bioburden ranged from approximately 0-30%. Our model does not explicitly represent bioburden within hosts. However, a reduction in bioburden during an infection could conceivably June 13, 2019 8/29
result in a reduced duration of infection and/or reduced infectiousness of the host. In our model, we translate the reduction in bioburden due to host immunity into a reduction in the duration of infection. Specifically, for each host i their expected relative duration of an infection by strain j compared to a host with no immunity is
if the host has temporary strain-specific immunity to strain j, 1 − ω 1 , if the host has only temporary strain-specific immunity to other strains, 0, if the host has enduring strain-specific immunity to strain j,
if the host has no strain-specific immunity to strain j and enduring strain-specific immunity to other strains, 1, otherwise.
(
Clearly, if a host has no immunity then the expected duration of an infection is not 149 reduced from the baseline duration 1/γ (since s = 1 in this case). If a host has 150 temporary strain-specific immunity of a strain at the time they are infected by this 151 strain, then the expected duration of infection is reduced according to the strength of 152 temporary strain-specific immunity σ (so that s = 1 − σ). A host with enduring 153 strain-specific immunity to a strain is essentially completely protected against infection 154 by this strain (since a subsequent infection by this strain will have zero duration).
155
Without strain-specific immunity to a strain, a host may still have a shorter expected In host settings where GAS disease is hyper-endemic and where high numbers of GAS 161 strains typically co-circulate, different strains of GAS have been observed to move 162 sequentially through communities rather than persist indefinitely [21] [22] [23] [24] . The 163 introduction of novel strains and previously circulating strains into these populations is 164 thought to be enabled by host mobility [34, 35] . Therefore, in our model, each day A uniformly at random to be replaced by immigrants. Immigrants are assumed to have a 167 similar immune profile to individuals in the population. This is implemented by 168 specifying that an immigrant will have the same immune profile as an individual 169 selected uniformly at random from the population. Immigrants may also be infected 170 with up to one copy of infection of any strain (chosen uniformly at random from all 171 n max strains in the region). The prevalence of infection in immigrants is set at 10% to 172 be consistent with the asymptomatic carriage rate of GAS across all age groups and 173 population settings [36] .
174

Summary statistics 175
Two metrics are used to summarise transmission dynamics in our model at the 176 population-level at time t: the diversity of strains D(t), and the prevalence of infected 177 hosts P (t). We choose these summary statistics as they can be calculated from existing 178 epidemiological data of GAS transmission [24] . Strain diversity is a measure of the total 179 number of strains as well as how evenly strains are distributed across all infections in the 180 host population. We calculate strain diversity using Simpson's reciprocal index, D(t):
where m j (t) is the number of infections of strain j in the host population at time t, and 182 M (t) is the total number of infections in the host population at time t. The prevalence 183 of infected hosts in a host population, P (t), is calculated as alter the prevalence of GAS in the Australian Indigenous context.
195
Since GAS is endemic in human populations, we only consider endemic transmission 196 dynamics in our model. All simulations are run for at least 50 years to allow the 197 epidemiological dynamics to reach a quasi-steady state where the level of immunity in 198 the population reaches a stable level. We measure population immunity by the mean 199 number of strains hosts in the population currently have immunity to, Y (t), and we 200 define the quasi-steady state (where Y (t) is stable) as the endemic equilibrium. We also 201 define P * and D * to be the endemic values of the summary statistics P (t) and D(t). Table 1 shows the parameters in our model and the values we considered in our 206 simulations. Parameters were selected to reflect GAS transmission an Indigenous 207 population of northern Australia, where GAS disease is hyper-endemic and the majority 208 of GAS infections are skin infections [24] .
209
The population size N and the number of strains circulating in the region n max are 210 set at 2500 and 40 respectively to be consistent with community sizes [24] and the 211 number of strains circulating [19] among Indigenous populations of northern Australia. 212
The mean duration of infection 1/γ is set at 14 days to be consistent with clinic data 213 collected in this setting [22] [23] [24] .
214
The number of daily contacts c is calculated using household contact data collected 215 in remote Australian Indigenous communities [38] . In this setting, it is estimated that 216
individuals make approximately 22 contacts per day on average in households. Due to a 217 lack of data describing contact patterns outside of households in these populations, we 218 June 13, 2019 setting [38] . Therefore, we set the mean number of daily contacts c to be 33.
222
Migration patterns are not described in this settings. We set the per capita expected 223 migration rate α to 0.002 per week which corresponds to an average of 5 migration 224 events per week when the population size N = 2500. With the prevalence of infection in 225 migrants set to 10%, infected migrants enter the population approximately once every 226 two weeks, which is consistent with genomic analysis of GAS isolates collected across 227 two Indigenous communities in Northern Australia [39] .
228
Values for parameters relating to the effects of immunity are determined from the 229 mouse model of GAS skin infection [31] . We set the strength of temporary strain-specific 230 immunity σ to 0.9 and the strength of temporary and enduring cross-strain immunity to 231 0.1. These values are based on the respective observations of 90% and 0-30% reduction 232 in bioburden in the mouse due to strain-specific and cross-strain immunity [31] .
233
To date, R 0 has not been calculated for GAS. We explore values of R 0 ranging from 234 1-10 (detailed below). For each combination of the parameters {R 0 , 1/γ, c} considered, 235 the baseline transmission probability β is calculated using Equation (2).
I. What are the population-level consequences of enduring strain-specific immunity being contingent on repeat infections?
238
The maximum inter-infection interval w was estimated to be three weeks in the mouse 239 model [31] . It is not clear how this timespan translates in humans. Based on 240 comparisons in mice versus humans of lifespan, the time of weaning, and the age of 241 adulthood onset, the equivalent 3-week timespan in humans could be estimated as 242 either 104 weeks, 19 weeks or 420 weeks, respectively [40] . Therefore, to understand the 243 population-level consequences of enduring strain-specific immunity being contingent on 244
repeated episodes of infection of the same strain, we consider all three of these estimates 245
for the maximum inter-infection interval w in humans, as well the case where w remains 246 unchanged between the mouse and human, that is, with w = {3, 19, 104, 420} weeks.
247
We explore values of R 0 in increments of 0.5 ranging from 1-10. This range includes 248 values of R 0 that are consistent with estimates for other pathogenic bacteria that 249 occupy similar niches to GAS: S. pneumoniae [41, 42] and Staphylococcus aureus [43] 250 (R 0 = 2-3). It also allows for the possibility that GAS may have a higher than expected 251 R 0 in Indigenous populations of northern Australia, where factors such as household 252 crowding [38] and poor access to clean water [44] may increase transmissibility. prevalence and strain diversity at each time point.
267
III. What is the potential impact of a multivalent vaccine?
268
A number of GAS vaccines are in the vaccine pipeline, including multivalent vaccines 269 targeted towards serotypes associated with pharyngitis and invasive disease in Northern 270
America and Western Europe [45] . While these targeted multivalent vaccines are 271 predicted to provide high strain coverage in their target populations, the coverage in 272 other populations where disease burden is much greater is predicted to be much 273 lower [17, 19] . For example, at the time of design, a leading multivalent GAS vaccine 274 was estimated to target only 25% of the serotypes of GAS circulating in Indigenous 275 populations of Australia, and 85-90% of serotypes in Northern America (ignoring any 276 potential cross reactivity between serotypes) [19] .
277
To investigate how a targeted 30-valent vaccine could potentially alter the prevalence 278 of GAS in the Indigenous Australian context, we simulate the effects of a vaccination and a vaccine effectiveness of 90% (which takes into account both imperfect vaccine 287 protectiveness and imperfect program coverage).
288
A region-wide vaccination program will likely alter the overall prevalence of vaccine 289 versus non-vaccine strains in the region. Therefore, strains infecting immigrants are no 290 longer chosen uniformly at random from all n max strains in the region. Instead, we 291 define the probability p v (t) to be the probability that a strain infecting an immigrant 292 will be a vaccine strain at time t. This is calculated as
where n v (t) and n nv (t) are, respectively, the number of vaccine strains and non-vaccine 294 June 13, 2019 14/29 strains present in the population at time t. This expression for p v (t) is chosen so that
295
(1) there is a small chance that an infected migrant will be carrying a vaccine strain 296 when there are no vaccine strains currently present in the population (since p v (t) > 0); 297
and (2) there is a small chance that an infected migrant will be carrying a non-vaccine 298 strain when there are no non-vaccine strains currently present in the population (since 299 p v (t) < 1). Since we are unsure how the vaccine will affect the overall prevalence of 300 infection, we make the conservative assumption that the prevalence of infection in 301 immigrants remains unchanged at 10%. For every infected immigrant, if it is 302 determined (via the probability p v ) that their infecting strain is a vaccine strain, then 303 this strain is chosen uniformly at random from the set of all vaccine strains. Conversely, 304
if it is determined that their infecting strain is a non-vaccine strain, then this strain is 305 chosen uniformly at random from the set of all non-vaccine strains. The vaccination 306 status of any immigrants coming into the population are determined in the same way as 307 their immune profiles -by specifying that the immune profile and vaccination status be 308 the same as that of individuals in the population sampled uniformly at random. 309 We assess a range of vaccine scenarios that vary by the extent to which the 30-valent 310 vaccine is tailored to the Australian Indigenous population context. We consider 311 scenarios where the vaccine protects against infection by 25% of GAS strains circulating 312 in the region (10 strains), an intermediate case where there is 50% strain coverage (20 313 strains), and a best-case scenario where all 30 strains targeted by the vaccine are strains 314 that are currently circulating in the region (corresponding to 75% strain coverage). For 315 each of these scenarios, we also explore the effect of further tailoring the vaccine to the 316 population by choosing the vaccine strains to be the most-prevalent strains at the 317 commencement of the intervention, as opposed to a random selection of strains (which 318 might arise if the vaccine were tailored to another population setting).
Results
326
I. The total prevalence of infection and strain diversity are 327 maintained by the successive reintroduction of strains 328
In our model, endemic transmission is characterised by continuous strain turnover 329 rather than the persistence of individual strains over long periods of time, which is 330 consistent with GAS epidemiological observations within endemic settings [21] [22] [23] [24] .
331
When individual strains appear in the population, they either fade out quickly or cause 332 an outbreak that can last for a period of months before going locally extinct and then 333 reappearing some time later due to a re-importation. Outbreaks of individual strains 334 can also partially overlap, but this overlap is reduced for larger outbreaks (see panels
335
A-B in Fig 2) . Fig 2) . of R 0 > 1 considered (Fig 3) . Further increases to w (beyond 19 weeks to 104 and 420 355 weeks) correspond to increasingly smaller reductions in the endemic prevalence P * and 356 strain diversity D * for all values of R 0 > 1 considered. When we compare the distributions of the endemic prevalence P * obtained from our 360 simulated data and real data collected in a hyper-endemic setting we find there is only a 361 substantial overlap of the interquartile ranges when the values of the inter-infection 362 interval w is set to w = 19 weeks, and when the basic reproduction number R 0 is set 363 between 2 ≤ R 0 ≤ 5 (Fig. 4A) . The corresponding simulated distributions of endemic 364 strain diversity D * have substantial overlap with that of the real data for all values of w 365 considered and when 2 ≤ R 0 ≤ 5. Therefore, we conclude that epidemiological data 366 collected in a hyper-endemic population is most consistent with our simulated data 367 generated with w = 19 and 2 ≤ R 0 ≤ 5. Model outputs are consistent with epidemiological data collected in a hyper-endemic population. The distribution of (A) the total endemic prevalence P * of infected hosts and (B) endemic strain diversity D * , from 80 simulations of the model, when the maximum inter-infection interval w is the value estimated in the mouse model of GAS skin infection (3 weeks), and when it is equal to three estimates of the equivalent timespan in humans (19, 104 and 420 weeks). Results are compared to population data (red) collected in one Indigenous community in the Northern Territory (NT) of Australia [24] . Here, R 0 = 2.5, 1/γ = 2 weeks, c = 33 per day, α = 0.002 per capita per week, n max = 40, n(0) = 35, N = 2500, x = 10, σ = 0.9, and ω 1 = ω 2 = 0.1. Similar results are obtained for 2 ≤ R 0 ≤ 5 for all values of w considered, as evidenced by the results shown in Fig. 3 , and so these results are not shown III. Impact of a targeted multivalent vaccine is dampened by 369 strain replacement 370 When we consider the impact of a targeted multivalent (serotype-specific) vaccine on 371 transmission, we find that the effects of the vaccine program in the short term (over the 372 first 2 years post introduction) and in the long term (once the system reaches a new 373 endemic equilibrium) depend on the number of distinct strains in circulation that the 374 vaccine protects against ( Fig 5) . Only short-term vaccine impact is dependent on the 375 prevalence of each vaccine strain at the commencement of the intervention, and the 376 choice of whether or not to implement the one-off catch-up campaign. Specifically, in vaccine scenarios with the one-off catch-up campaign, prevalence P (t) 378
is quickly reduced following commencement of the vaccine program compared to reduction in prevalence is greater when the vaccine is targeted towards the 381 most-prevalent strains in the population at the time of the intervention, particularly for 382 strain coverage less than 50% (see panels D-F in Fig. 5 ). However, prevalence rebounds 383 in the months following the catch-up campaign to levels that are seen in equivalent 384 scenarios without the catch-up campaign. On average, this occurs within a year when 385 the strain coverage in the vaccine is 50% or less. When the coverage is 75%, this process 386 takes, on average, twice as long.
387
In the long term, we find that the vaccine reduces the endemic prevalence P * by an 388 amount that is less than the percentage of circulating strains targeted by the vaccine.
389
Specifically, with 25%, 50% and 75% strain coverage in the vaccine, the median endemic 390 prevalence P * is reduced by 20%, 38% and 65% respectively. The failure to fully sustain 391 initial reductions in prevalence following vaccine introduction is due to the partial 392 replacement of vaccine strains with non-vaccine strains, as evidenced by the 393 corresponding small reductions in median endemic strain diversity D * of 18%, 20% and 394 40%, respectively.
395
Discussion
396
Incomplete understanding of the the immune response to GAS infection in individuals 397 and the development of herd immunity in host populations represents a key barrier to 398 the development of a globally effective GAS vaccine. Current consensus is that the 399 immune response to GAS infection is largely strain (serotype)-specific [25] . Recent 400 evidence in a murine model of GAS skin infection raises the possibility that the longevity 401 of this immune response may be contingent on individuals experiencing a repeat episode 402 of infection by the same strain within a narrow time window [31] . As yet, there is no transmissibility has competing effects on the likelihood of hosts acquiring enduring immunity in our model, which leads to a complex relationship between transmissibility 440 and prevalence.
441
Increasing the basic reproduction number R 0 from small values initially corresponds 442 to a rise in the endemic prevalence of infection P * due to increased transmission. This 443 increase in P * continues until transmission reaches a critical level whereupon it becomes 444 more feasible for hosts to encounter the same strain twice within the required time 445 window w and acquire enduring immunity. In this regime, further increases to R 0 446 correspond to increased levels of herd immunity that eventually lead to reductions in 447 the endemic prevalence P * for further increases to R 0 . However, these further increases 448
to R 0 correspond to increasingly smaller reductions in the endemic prevalence P * , 449 possibly because the reduction in duration of outbreaks of individual strains (which 450 coincide with increases to transmissibility) make it more difficult for hosts to experience 451 multiple episodes of infection of the same strain during a single outbreak.
452
A possible consequence of a non-monotonic relationship existing between R 0 and the 453 endemic prevalence is that interventions designed to reduce R 0 (e.g., via social 454 interventions to improve household crowding or access to healthcare or running water) 455 may lead to different outcomes in populations characterised with different baseline R 0 . 456
For example, an intervention that leads to a substantial reduction in prevalence in one 457 population may lead to very little change or even an increase in prevalence in a different 458 population that has a higher baseline R 0 .
459
Short and long-term benefits of tailoring a multivalent vaccines 460
to target populations 461 Our study also demonstrated how our model can be used to interpret and predict the 462 effects of a targeted multivalent-vaccine intervention in a high-incidence setting. A key 463 determinant of long-term vaccine impact is the number of strains that the vaccine 464 protects against that are circulating in the greater geographic region of the population. 465
The greatest long-term reductions in prevalence occur when all strains in the vaccine are 466 those in circulation, indicating the importance of customising a multivalent vaccine to 467 particular host settings, or incorporating more conserved antigens with multivalent formulations [17] .
Nevertheless, the high strain turnover that characterises transmission is likely to 470 limit the long-term effectiveness of a targeted multivalent vaccine that does not protect 471 against every strain in circulation. In our model, the replacement of vaccine strains 472 with non-vaccine strains occurred within a few years of the implementation of the 473 vaccine intervention. This occurred even when there was 75% vaccine strain coverage, 474 and following significant short-term reductions in prevalence. While it may be the case 475 that initial reductions in prevalence following the introduction of the vaccine cannot be 476 sustained, it may be possible for long-term benefits to arise if the vaccine is rolled out in 477 combination with other interventions designed to reduce transmission. It will be crucial 478
to conduct surveillance for a number of years following vaccine introduction to evaluate 479 short-and long-term vaccine impact.
480
Limitations and future work 481
In our model of GAS transmission in an Indigenous population of northern Australia, 482 we assume that all GAS infections lead to the same type of immune response -that 483 which was was observed in the mouse model of GAS skin infection [31] -since the 484 majority of mild GAS infections in this setting are skin infections [23, 24] . However, in 485 lower incidence settings, current consensus is that GAS causes throat infections more 486 frequently than skin infections [18] . Furthermore, GAS can also be carried in the nose 487 and throat of hosts without symptoms, and, less frequently, cause invasive disease [18] . 488
It is not clear whether these other types of GAS infections cause an analogous immune 489 response. If so, future modelling work could consider transmission and the effect of 490 interventions in populations where other or multiple types of immune responses to GAS 491 infection occur. 492 We have assumed that all GAS strains in the model have identical epidemiological 493 characteristics. Further empirical work is needed to determine the validity of this 494 assumption. Given that all strains share the same ecological niche, any differences in 495 the competitive ability of strains will likely alter the level of strain diversity that can be 496 sustained over short and long timescales in populations [47] . Furthermore, perturbations 497 to pathogen population structure through the implementation of a vaccine targeting a 498 June 13, 2019 22/29 subset of strains is likely to also depend on the epidemiological characteristics of targeted strains relative to non-targeted strains [47] .
500
There are parallels between our simulation results and observed responses to the 501 multivalent vaccines targeting another highly diverse human pathogen, S. pneumoniae. 502 S. pneumoniae has over 90 different serotypes, and the multivalent pneumococcal 503 conjugate vaccines (PCVs) targeted the most prevalent S. pneumoniae serotypes 504 responsible for severe disease in different populations. The response to the PCVs varied 505 across subgroups within these populations [48, 49] . However, generally there was a 506 decrease in detection of vaccine strains and an increase in detection of non-vaccine 507 strains following the implementation of PCV programs [50] . This is speculated to be 508 due, in part, to strain replacement [50] , similar to what occurred in our simulations.
509
However, evolutionary factors such as serotype switching [51] and selection dynamics 510 associated with the accessory genome, which remained relatively unchanged pre and 511 post the implementation of the PCVs [52] , may also have played a role in the observed 512 vaccine response. Future work could consider exploring similar factors in the context of 513 a GAS vaccine by incorporating evolutionary dynamics, such as mutation and 514 recombination, into our model. 
